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Abstract
We discuss a high-level model for software
applications and services that can support a minimal
set of human-centric trust management capabilities.
We outline the unique set of challenges we must
address if we are to attain a level of trust that will be
required for a robust deployment of an IoT. We
discuss the role of standards and how we can
maximize the effectiveness of standards and device
and service certification. We suggest a set of
solutions for trust management that can support the
unique security, safety, and privacy requirements of a
robust IoT. Prominent among these solutions is the
use of an older approach for access control, viz. the
reference monitor, and blockchain technologies that
can record trust and policy graphs and trust-related
attributes for IoT devices and supporting services. An
open, but governed trust blockchain can serve as a
universal trusted oracle.

1. Introduction
More than any technology that has ever emerged
so far, the Internet of Things (IoT) represents an
evolution of computing that challenges our ability to
manage the safety and security of our environment.
As technologies are developed and introduced into
the world, we rarely understand the full implications
of their use, or even how dominant they may be
come. This was true of the mobile communications
industry [1], and the computing industry itself [2]. In
the past we usually have had time to introduce
standardized security solutions to deal with new
threats as they emerge, though it has often been
painful. The software industry has a long history of
successfully supporting standards as computing has
evolved [3]. However, we are now faced with the
fact that computing technology is evolving faster than
our ability to contend with the threats we can see
clearly, much less the threats that will only emerge
after new technologies are fully ensconced. The fact
that IoT computing is ubiquitous, pervasive, and is
now invading the innards of (what were once) the
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simplest of commonplace things, means that the
number of stakeholders in any standard has increased
in ways that make establishing consensus much more
challenging. It may be more prudent to advocate a
mixture of flexible standard approaches and
cooperative strategies that address the most imposing
requirements. This paper nominates some of those. In
the past computing standards were typically designed
in response to a desire for interoperability among
multiple implementations of protocols or software
components. Now, it is more important that software
standards for IoT additionally address the need for
humans to be able to contend with the complexity
that IoT thrusts upon us, especially where it pertains
to the ability of people to trust and manage the safety
and security of IoT devices as well as the impact of
potential accidental use or nefarious abuse of those
devices on our lives.
Some previous works [4-7] address the need for
new IoT trust models in line with what we propose,
specifically recognizing the need for a more generally
effective access control strategy and the usefulness of
social graphs to accommodate less rigid policies.
We will continue the discussion as follows:
• Enumerate the drivers for a new informal
trust model for the IoT
• Outline the components of a distributed trust
model for the IoT that use trust graphs and
policy graphs
• Describe solutions based on Blockchain
technologies that indicate how this model can
work
• Describe how to introduce minimal standards
and cooperative strategies for establishing
trust in an evolving IoT

2. Drivers for a new IoT Trust Model
We believe that any trust model for IoT needs to
accommodate the main drivers of its evolution in the
context of distributed computing. We enumerate
them here:
1. Ubiquity and Scale
2. Hyper-connectivity
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3.
4.

Cyber-physical integration
New interaction models

2.1 Ubiquity and scale
Numerous projections have been made of the
expected growth of the number of Internet connected
devices [8]. As the numbers progress through the tens
of billions (and the often-quoted trillions of sensors),
it becomes obvious that new strategies are needed to
be able to manage and personalize all of these
devices. People will own or be asked to interact with
and /or manage hundreds of IoT devices and in
industrial settings, often more. We need to find ways
to tame the complexity that could overwhelm us if
every device or software designer chooses their own
unique interaction model.
Never before has the amount of data about
individual people and their behavior been produced
on this scale. New strategies for the governance and
secure management of these many devices and the
vast amounts of data they produce will be required to
ensure that people are not overwhelmed by the IoT’s
complexity and scale.

2.2 Hyper-connectivity
We need to recognize that IoT devices are not just
connected to the Internet, but rather they are
connected to one another in myriad ways. This has
profound implications for trust and security models.
Individuals who may bring a device into their home
or need to manage them in an enterprise may have
little idea of the number of different network
connections a device can make, and the number of
different protocols they may use. Additionally,
network connectivity is constantly changing as
individuals with their personal area networks move
throughout their homes, other people’s homes,
offices, and public places. As automobiles, with their
burgeoning networks encounter the networks of the
highway and urban infrastructure, and other
automobiles, connectivity changes rapidly using
many modalities, and using many different network
layers and protocols.
This has profound implications for both trust and
security models. It means we cannot rely on network
security in order to protect ourselves. The weak link
principle will overwhelm us. There will be no
reasonable way to tell what device is connected to
which network. Worse, as we need to worry about
contamination, we won’t know what device has been
connected to what network, and what applications
running on a device may have interacted with what
applications on a network that may have been

invaded by hostile entities. This all implies that
devices and their applications will need to
increasingly be responsible for self-protection. It is
the only strategy that scales and deals with the issues
of hyper-connectivity.
While device and application self-defense will be
increasingly necessary, that does not mean that
devices cannot seek help from trusted sources. We
will discuss that strategy later.

2.3 Cyber-physical integration
This is perhaps the most obvious driver of a trust
model for IoT, yet it is not clear that it is fully
appreciated. Resources in IoT devices do not just
include processors and memory, but rather they
include components that can easily be turned into
weapons and even weapons of mass destruction when
used in scale. Currently we see ransomware being
applied to office computers and controllers for
remote locks, but of course there is no reason this
cannot go much further as the cyber world integrates
with critical infrastructure controlling dams,
electrical grids, etc. This point has been made
repeatedly, and the threat has been clearly
instantiated for years (see the stories of the Stuxnet
virus [9], where there were successful attacks on
devices that were not even directly network
connected). Yet, we see deployments of IoT devices
where little thought has been given regarding
potential misuse and disruption. That may be all well
and good for the moment, but as we have seen when
technologies become fully ensconced in our culture
and we become increasingly dependent on them, the
emergence of misuse and abuse inevitably ensues.

2.4 New modes of interaction
As computing evolved, we saw new modes of
interaction introduced, and sometimes it was not until
the next stage of evolution that we saw those new
modes become commonplace. For example, when
networked computing arrived, mobile code was
introduced, but when networked computing evolved
to mobile computing, mobile code (in the form of
apps) became more dominant and that refined model
of software distribution and maintenance is even
being retrofitted to networked desktop computing. As
an aside, this is a good example of where security
design kept up (at least somewhat) with the evolution
of technology. The dominant mobile operating
systems (IoS sand Android) took the mobile code
security problem head-on. In fact, their approach can
evolve to a good approach for IoT security, as
discussed later.
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The IoT, as we see it currently evolving, includes
many relatively new modes of interaction that we
should model, as they are critical to the trust model.
IoT human interaction modes have far greater variety
as humans interact with things through both physical
and virtual interfaces. Machine to machine
interactions while not entirely new are introduced in
a more commonplace way, and devices are linked
together to form more complex composite devices
where events on one device trigger events on other
devices (think the IFTTT service [10], but in an IoT
context where devices expose services used by other
devices). Furthermore, IoT devices will increasingly
come equipped with virtual cloud images and cloud
services that extend both the capabilities of those
devices as well as their interaction models. Cloud
services provide or amplify the “intelligent”
capabilities of the devices. We see this as another
class of IoT device interaction.
The IoT trust model thus needs to address
security, safety, and privacy aspects of all three
distinguished classes of interaction: 1) human
interaction,
2)
machine-to-machine
(M2M)
interaction, and 3) cloud services interaction.

2.5 Trust model drivers and “security by
design”
“Security by design”, “safety and security first”
and other slogans and aphorisms are of course
shorthand descriptors that are not well-defined.
However, if we place them in a trust model context,
we can begin to develop a process that makes these
sentiments actionable. Recognizing the drivers, we
can begin to more comprehensively list threats and
hazards and prioritize them. In fact, that might be the
first aspect of a IoT device security standard. The
device manufacturer will need to show how the
software on the device provides safety, security, and
privacy given considerations of scale, connectivity,
and interaction modes.
We also must take these sentiments seriously. As
we have outlined above, IoT is an evolution of
distributed computing where the scale is enormous,
the misuse can involve virtually everything, and the
pathways for spreading mischief and nefarious
behavior are many.
The discussion below is meant to allow us to
focus on IoT device and system design that focuses
on security, safety, and privacy first.

3. Standard components of an IoT trust
model

Trust in our context means reliance. Here we ask
what do we need to rely on in order to enjoy safety,
security, and privacy when we introduce an IoT
device into our environment. A standard approach to
establishing these attributes is to completely list the
device’s resources. Here are classes of resources that
we want to see:
•
•
•
•

Device controls (anything that can make
the device do something)
State information
Sensor information
Computing
resources
(processors,
memory, embedded programs)

Once we have these enumerated, we ask who can
have access to them, and how. In the case of a hyperconnected IoT device the assumption must be that
everyone has access to all resources, unless there are
governance mechanisms for the resources. The
challenge is immediately clear: How to make all of
this comprehensible to the end user or person
responsible for deployment and maintenance of the
device? How do we make it easy for someone to rely
on the governance mechanisms? This introduces the
next class of the trust model components, namely
trusted attributes. Some entity can evaluate and test
the device and determine that the resources are
protected, or that they do not pose a hazard, or any
number of assertions that can relieve a device user or
manager of responsibility or worry. We will need to
standardize on both the substance and nomenclature
for these attributes in ways that ordinary people can
understand, and we will need to allow policy to
determine whether to trust some entity that makes
such assertions. In order to properly deal with the
complexity thrust upon us by IoT, standardizing on
trusted attributes will be essential.
Access to resources on a device will not always
be static, and so part of the trust model will
necessarily be means for delegation. If I have an
electronic lock, I might establish sole control over its
state, but I may want to give selected others a
permission. How permissions are established and
enforced is part of a delegation model that needs to
be explicitly described, and again should be made
understandable to ordinary people. This can be very
tricky however, since delegation mechanisms that are
truly explicit and don’t rely on faulty assumptions of
trust transitivity are difficult. The implications of
delegation need to be accommodated. For example, it
may not always be apparent that giving a youngster
access to your home automation system also gives
them access to safety related mechanisms that they
may not understand.
Page 5668

The previous paragraph serves to introduce us to
another part of an effective trust model, namely
performance aids that can help us understand the
consequences of action, give us guidance, and tame
complexity. We cannot rely on (i.e. trust) effective
governance that is neither understandable to an
average user or overly complex. Trusted performance
aids (often in the form of web services) will be an
essential part of an IoT trust model. They will help
with scale and complexity, especially when we use
cryptographic key management mechanisms to
implement a permissions model for resource
governance across many devices.
In the course of delegation as well as other tasks
associated with IoT management, we will need to
identify things and the entities we want to trust with
access to their resources. Thus, identity management
will be an essential high-level component of a trust
model. This is an area that we know has been
problematic in the past. It will require a more
intuitive system for identifying people and other
entities as well as their attributes. Secure approaches
to this using hierarchical X.509 and SAML certs have
already proven inadequate. Below, we describe an
approach that has a greater chance of dealing with the
scale and complexity of the IoT.
Composite devices need to be part of the trust
model. These can be arrays of physically separate but
similar devices, or they can be heterogeneous
assemblies of devices whose union is defined by
software, often running on the cloud. Such
composites will become increasingly commonplace
in order to tame the complexity of device
management. We will need to recognize the fact that
while IoT devices are most often designed and
configured by manufacturers, composite devices will
more often be defined and configured by end-users
who may not be subject to the same regulation and
subject their creations to the same testing and
certification schemes as device manufacturers. This
will be a challenge for any IoT trust model.

and requirements are practically overwhelming, yet
we are attempting to find simpler approaches to
address them.

4.1 The reference monitor concept
The trust model discussion above began with the
ability to enumerate resources and then define means
for governing access to them. The concept of a
Reference Monitor [11-12]] was first designed in the
1970s to perform this governance task. One can think
of a reference monitor as a firewall between the
“outside world” and the resources provided by a
device. It is typically implemented as a core (or
kernel) process that checks each command or request
against a list of security associations (see below) for
permissions to take an action or access some
resource. The idea was used in the Windows NT
kernel (and later editions), but reference monitors
have gone out of fashion due to the fact that
implementation becomes highly difficult when device
interaction models are complex. Nonetheless, we
imagine that at least a very simple reference monitor
should be a part of any IoT device. In fact, the
simpler the better, and we will need to make sure that
device interaction models are compact. We
fundamentally believe that in large scale hyperconnected deployments of cyber-physical devices we
cannot afford to support arbitrary multi-tasking,
multi-user interaction at the end-points. We generally
do not need to in the IoT. Let’s consider a simple
model of an IoT device in the following figure:

4. Direction toward some solutions
We cannot possibly describe here adequate
solutions to the challenges posed by a comprehensive
IoT trust model. Indeed, we only gave a very high
level outline of a trust model above. However, we do
want to point to some relevant approaches to the
issues identified above. Some approaches are directly
derived from prior research and experience in
computer security and others are more speculative
and will require extensive, forward-looking research
and development. We have seen that our challenges

The distinguished resources in the device include a
remote front panel RFP (allowing remote control of
the devices functions), device state, sensor data, and
general computing resources. The reference monitor
intercepts every request to access these resources
through every communication interface. The requests
are authenticated using a message authentication
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code referencing an authentication key that is part of
a security association record. The key is typically a
symmetric cryptographic key shared between the
device and the entity making the request. The
security association will also include a set of
permissions for the requesting entity. If the message
is authenticated, the requesting entity’s identity will
also be confirmed and the permissions together with
the device’s root policy will determine access to the
requested resource. In IoT, we make the assumption
that general purpose computing resources will rarely
be referenced except by a small number of entities for
maintenance purpose. The RFP, state, and sensors
will often be involved in P2P entity interaction with a
limited class of entities, and the security association
and policy data bases will be referenced by an even
more restricted set of entities. Under this device
interaction model, the use of a reference monitor
seems quite reasonable, and we can make the direct
to device interaction model even simpler by using the
“digital twin” concept [13] whereby many
interactions with the IoT device can be performed via
an interaction with a virtual digital copy stored in the
cloud or at a service point accessible to both the
cloud and the device (gateway). The twin can then
serve as a distinguished entity with a distinguished
security association.
Now a number of issues come to mind: how do
we establish this explicit security association, and
isn’t this overkill for simple devices? We want to
address these questions before continuing further.
A security association is also a well-worn
concept in computer security. As mentioned above,
an IoT device can maintain a list of entities that may
have permissions to access the resources of a device.
This will be a table of entries where each entry
consists of an identity of a remote entity, a symmetric
cryptographic key shared by the device and the
remote entity, a list of permissions the remote entity
has regarding the device’s resources, and some other
info to help thwart replay attacks. When a command
comes through an RFP interface, the reference
monitor will check the message authentication code
provided by the remote entity. This is a code that can
only be properly constructed using the shared secret
key. Unless I have arranged for an entity to have a
security association with this device, no matter how
much that entity may have invaded my other network
devices, or even has access to the LAN, this device
will not be directly accessible by that entity. Now the
reader may observe that the device could still be
attacked if a peer with a proper security association
has been commandeered. However, the damage may
be limited by the scope of the permissions granted to
that peer in the security association data base, and of

course we presume that peers are likewise protected
by similar security monitors.
We advocate that a reference monitor be a
standard, foundational aspect of all IoT devices, and
that the governance of device resources be traced to a
robust reference monitor implementation. This can be
done while keeping simple things simple. However,
the skeptic will rightfully observe that we have a
dependency on cryptographic key management,
which even in simple systems is hard to properly
implement. In fact, systems secured using
cryptography are often successfully attacked through
the key management system and not by breaking the
crypto. In addition, permissions management is even
more complex, with transitive trust issues limiting the
effectiveness of straightforward solutions. So, we
next discuss how security associations and key
management systems can be implemented in a
scalable way using cloud-based performance aids
which are part of our trust model. Then we discuss
more general trust management solutions that can aid
us in overall IoT device management.

4.2 Security
management

Associations

and

IoT

key

Much of the complexity in the management of
security associations derives from the complexity of
security association management protocols. This
starts with bootstrapping trust and root key
management. Cloud-based trusted performance aids
can help us simplify key management from the point
of view of the end user and also the device designer.
The IoT trust model must include robust processes
for cloud service interaction as we mentioned above
(see the discussion on digital twin). This is a
distinguished kind of M2M interaction distinctly
different from the M2M interaction characterized by
devices acting in concert as composite devices. The
trust relationship is quite different, and often involves
trust roots embodied by asymmetric keys whose
secret parts can be managed by cloud services that
can afford the resources to properly protect them. We
expect that humans can interact through a helpful UI
with web services that can construct virtual images of
security association tables used by device reference
monitors, again using the digital twin concept.
Devices will need to be deployed with root keys
that can be used to authenticate these web-based
digital twins and or other trusted performance aids.
Other than the relatively rare use of an authentication
key for device renewability, heavy duty
cryptographic protocols can be avoided in most
devices, certainly the devices whose IoT interfaces
only expose an RFP, state and sensor data, and a
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secure update protocol. It is beyond the scope of this
paper, but we have designed scalable systems with
high grades of security that place little burden on the
device implementation. There are a number of
considerations not discussed here, but we must say
that the trust modeling is actually not that simple and
requires assurances that require restrictions that are
not always easy to accommodate. An example
involves protection of root keys. In cases where we
can severely constrain access to all computing
resources in a device, and physical invasion of the
innards of a device is not part of the attack model,
protecting root keys in IoT devices is not difficult.
However, in other cases we must employ more
sophisticated and robust software self-defense
methods, and hardware security methods. We
mention, as an aside, that hardware security when
available, can seem to be a simple solution but it is
rarely adequate by itself mostly because the interface
to a specialized secure subsystem needs to be
carefully implemented and protected. Software
security and careful design cannot be abdicated.
For many applications, IoT key management,
security association management, and delegation of
authority will require much more sophisticated trust
management. We will need to have mechanisms that
identify entities that make trusted statements
instructing devices or advising people to rely on
various assertions. While we claim that a simple
concept of a reference monitor, properly
implemented can solve our problems. We have just
deferred the problem to the age-old issue of who
CAN we trust for what purposes? The network
security approach to this involves X.509 identity
certificates and associated SAML certificates for
trusted assertions [14]. Given the trust model drivers
discussed above, we cannot rely on this technology
which even in the hierarchical network security world
is hard to maintain. With the kinds of IoT interaction
models we already see emerging, hierarchical trust
management will not work and does not scale well.
We do, however, see a solution, discussed in the next
section.

4.3 Assertion Blockchains and their use in a
trust management system for IoT
There are numerous proposals for the use of
Blockchains in IoT applications [15-17]. These
generally relate to their use for workflows, “smart
contracts,” and immutable transaction ledgers for
peer-to-peer IoT interactions, and applications such
as supply chain management. But, here, we want to
use blockchains for very basic assertions in trust
management.

When introducing the use of blockchains in basic
distributed computing applications, we hasten to
disassociate the approach from blockchains designed
to be used for Internet currencies or distributed
ledgers designed for other kinds of value exchange.
We use the term assertion blockchain to denote an
application using a combination of Merkle hash trees
and hash chains in combination with an appropriately
chosen Byzantine Consensus Protocol [18] to
robustly and immutably record assertions. In this
case, the assertions will typically correspond to edges
in a trust graph or policy graph, where a trust graph
consists of identity nodes, and an edge between nodes
A and B is labeled with a set of conditions. An edge
connecting A and B with those conditions means that
when those conditions are satisfied, A trusts B, or
sometimes A delegates trust to B.
A policy graph is used in a decision process, and
an edge relates a set of conditions to a set of
permissible actions that can then determine
conditions that relate to another set of permissible
actions.
Governance of IoT resources can be administered
with the aid of an assertion blockchain, where various
assertions are referenced iteratively. An IoT assertion
blockchain will have permissions that are determined
within the blockchain itself. However, it will also
incorporate blockchain write permissions for certain
root assertion types. Here is an example in a
traditional context that illustrates this:
I may get an email from someone whose email
address is abc@xyz.com with an attachment that
includes a number of statements that say something
like (PK_- indicates a public key):
“PK_A at time/date said PK_B ia validator for
email from abc@xyz.com“
“PK_C at time/date said PK_A is a validator for
email from the domain xyz.com”
“Pk_D at time/date said PK_C is a validator for
all assertions made through the domain xyz.com
My email client can then use a policy graph with
policy statements that 1) guide me to use the
blockchain to validate all of the statements above,
and 2) validate each step in a policy graph up to
compliance with a root policy. This would be in lieu
of using X.509 cert chains. The policy graph may
require me to check whether any of the statements
have been controverted by later statements
(amounting to revocation).
Trust graphs can be embedded into a block chain
as can policy graphs, that determine under what
conditions I can trust an assertion, however the
blockchain embedded policy graph will eventually
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lead my client to evaluate a locally embedded root
policy with statements that are not embedded in the
blockchain. It is this root policy that needs to be
protected from alteration by other means, such as
locally managed software integrity protection that is
also part of the trust model.
There are a number of considerations to be made
for an open but governable assertion blockchain that
can function, practically, as a universal oracle that
can help us determine what to believe. One such
consideration is confidentiality. We believe that a
publicly accessible blockchain can be used for storing
authenticators of confidential statements. This can be
done by using hashes of public keys and hashes of
the assertions, and supplying the full keys and
assertion documents out of band, and under private
governance, but in a way that authentication of
provenance is still preserved. We will need to take
care that correlations don’t make things easy to track.
We are currently working on a number of approaches
for that.
Currently deployed systems that use blockchains
like Bitcoin to immutably record assertions do not
scale for use for IoT applications, where we need
ultra- low cost, low latency, and large capacity in
terms of transactions per second. The example above
cited a familiar trust management task that we
believe can be implemented more flexibly and
effectively using blockchain embedded trust graphs
and policy graphs. However, the absolute need for a
new approach is shown by the following IoT
example.

4.4 Example: Trusting sensors
Suppose that we want to forensically validate a
photograph made with a digital camera, and sent
anonymously to a news organization. Can we trust
the image the photograph represents? A policy graph
could guide us through a number of steps each one of
which would require trust validation. Some assertions
that will need to be checked are relatively static,
while others will be part of a high-volume stream of
assertion blockchain entries. This is because a trust
decision would require an assertion from the raw
photographic sensor in the device, and perhaps an
assertion from the GPS device. Assertions from each
of the software modules both within the original
device containing the photographic sensor and from
postprocessor modules that may lie outside of it. In
cases where we might expect even a small probability
that the authenticity and provenance of the sensor
recording might be questioned, we could record these
assertions in the block chain. We summarize just
some of the assertions that might be required to

verify chain of handling and control in the table
below.
Entity

Blockchain recording

Photo Sensor
Raw output

Sensor credentials, calibrations
Hash of main sensor output file, other
readings (time, GPS…)
Software credentials
Device credentials
Hash of main sensor file, process IDs
for transformations from Device SW,

Device SW
Mobile Device
Output Photo
Workstation
Software
Final Photo

Software credentials
Hash of Photo with post-processing
software IDs

The specifics may vary, depending on the way
processes are composed within trusted modules.
There are billions of photographic sensors in
existence already, deployed by hundreds if not
thousands of different device manufacturers, and
while even in the future checking the authenticity and
provenance of a photograph may not be required very
often, we don’t know when and for what photograph
we may need validation. Thus, we will need to record
trust assertions from many sources: individual
sensors, devices that house those sensors,
manufacturers of the devices, originators of software
post-processing apps, etc.
This example involves the authentication of just
one type of sensor, however there are many more
types that will become increasingly relevant as we
rely on sensor information for all kinds of decisions,
including real-time decisions involved with the
governance and operation of critical infrastructure.
Contributions to a blockchain embedded trust graph,
policy graph, in combination with provenance
assertions
for
recordings
and
recording
transformations for an increasing number of relevant
sensors will need scale that no system has currently
achieved. Permission-less blockchains that rely on
byzantine consensus protocols that are based on proof
of work or proof of stake will not scale. A blockchain
approach that uses consensus approaches for writing
to the blockchain that also includes contextual
permissions may well do the trick.

4.5 Assertion Blockchains with contextual
write permissions
Although verification of the right to enter
assertions into the blockchain can be done by
referencing rights that have been asserted previously
using the Blockchain, expediency and prioritization
of assertions to be included and which will achieve
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consensus will require protocols that recognize the
right to enter a new block by entities dependent on
context. In currency transaction blockchains, miners
can prioritize transactions even choosing according to
transaction fee bidding. In addition, the protocol
permits a new block only every ten minutes, and
block size is fixed. These restrictions and approaches
do not scale properly for many IoT assertion
blockchain applications. Thus, a governance model
for an assertion blockchain is required that allows
flexible policy to determine who and when an entity
has priority to write a block. The policy graph for
governance will also be embeddable in the
blockchain. A robust and well-defined governance
model, and standards and rules for maintaining a
policy graph for write permissions and consensus
regarding the next block to be written and when, will
be required. While an explicit governance model
means the assertion blockchain is not completely
open, it will negate the need for the massive overhead
entailed by proof of work approaches and the
artificial valuations required by proof of stake. We
will require standards for governance, and
certification of policy and the contextual permissions
themselves.

4.6 Other supportive cloud services
Those who are owners of or are responsible for
IoT devices can benefit from a number of cloudbased services that we need to accommodate in the
interaction part of the trust model, and may benefit
from some standardization. The first class of these we
will call Virtualization and Visualization services.
Such services will allow virtual images of devices to
appear in graphical depictions made available
through cloud services. As a device is deployed it can
appear in one or more depictions that provide its
state, and allow a user to interact with the device
through a richer UI. One of the benefits of this
approach is that the web service can also simulate for
the user the consequences of any configuration
including how changes may affect safety, security,
and privacy regarding a specific device that might be
the subject of focus, but also other devices that might
interact with that device. These services can also
allow graphically aided configuration of composite
devices, and simulate how these composite devices
will work. Again, this will be tremendously useful for
end-users who need to be informed of the safety,
security, and privacy consequences of interactions
among IoT devices. These simulations will be more
robust and discernable if IoT device interactions are
standardized to some extent.

Since the virtualization and visualization services
may do more than simulate possible interactions,
rather they will be privy to actual configurations of
devices, and change those configurations, we need to
accommodate these services in the trust model, and
there will need to be a well-understood and ideally
standardized method of interaction between users and
the V&V services and between those services and the
actual devices.
Another class of web service that will be helpful
and which will have a big impact on the trust model
will be data analytics services for data collected from
device sensors, but also from event streams generated
by IoT devices. These services can be granted
permissions to collect a stream directly from the
devices, or they could be given permissions to collect
data from a web cache that collects data directly. In
the latter case, a web service could get information
from derived data, allowing perhaps only relevant
data to be accessed. In any case the trust model here
could become fairly complicated given the variety of
policies that the web service may follow regarding
the disposition of data, and their claims of ownership.
We have seen examples of data collection where a
manufacturer monitors internal sensors of industrial
devices, yet will not share that information with the
end user or device owner. One can see that use of IoT
data for forensic reasons (what caused a failure) and
for predictive maintenance will be valuable. Data
ownership issues will need to be worked out, but
from our point of view, we want to at least make data
flow and data access explicit.
One class of web service featuring data analytics
that can be very supportive involves the analysis of
event data to find security anomalies that could point
to imminent attacks. This is a sensitive area, and an
example where sharing data could benefit the
common interest, even if it might reveal some
information that might be considered proprietary. We
believe such services will become fairly
commonplace, as IoT devices will be vulnerable to
systemic attacks and services that detect anomalous
behavior will be useful for defending against such
attacks. The trust model here will need to recognize
the benefits and privileged access of these services,
and the services will need to provide information
regarding how data is protected, especially when
some analytical approaches may involve comingling
of different entity’s data.

5. More on standards and governance
As mentioned above, it is harder to agree on
standards when so many stakeholders are involved,
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and technology is moving fast. But, considering the
end-user point of view as in [19], we realize that in
order to contend with the scale and complexity of
IoT, we will need to standardize on certain aspects of
user interaction, nomenclature and other areas where
lack of understanding could lead to safety and
security hazards. We need to make choices about
what to standardize and while in the software field
we often are more concerned about interoperability,
in this new world of IoT where software design can
create physical hazards and lack of understanding by
users can result in serious safety and security faults,
standards will need to be motivated by user
experience, and the need to limit complexity brought
about by lack of standardization. While this is not
completely new to the software world, we are going
to need to deal with these issues more systematically.
Consider standards for automotive operator UI. Some
things are not standardized, like the location of light
switches, but the brake pedal can be found in the
same place on every car. There are higher level
standards that deal with complexity of the automotive
UI. See for example the overview published by the
ITU-T focus group on driver distraction [20].
We have been using a trust model to organize our
thoughts and form the basis of reasoning about
safety, security, and privacy. This led us far beyond a
focus on devices themselves, and helped us consider
their entire interactive context. We will review the
components described above and discuss implications
for standardization.
Resources – we will need standards that
encourage IoT device manufacturers to enumerate all
accessible resources and demonstrate how access is
protected using a reference monitor approach. We
believe it will be helpful for resource nomenclature to
be standardized so that users are less likely to be
confused and overwhelmed when they need to
manage IoT devices from different sources.
A reference monitor should be a standard part of
all IoT devices, and simply implemented in simple
devices. Cloud services can help maintain the
requisite security associations in more complex
devices.
Another standard aspect of IoT devices should be
a documented interaction model that can be used
when the device is evaluated to determine safety,
security, and privacy properties. This model should
show how resources are accessible by default, and
how the reference monitor (or some interface to it)
and root and dynamic policies affect interaction. This
model should cover user, M2M, and cloud service
interactions. We believe that interactions with other
devices and services that collect data from IoT
devices need to be explicitly highlighted with

explanations of what data is collected, and what the
service may do with it. We believe that the
interaction model can be simplified using device
virtualization (digital twin) approaches.
Trusted attributes are labels that are applied to
devices by trusted third parties. Nomenclature should
be standardized, and standard ways of authenticating
attribution should allow machine resident policies
that reference those attributes to be properly
executed.
We have recommended that a universal standard
assertion blockchain be used for immutably
recording trusted attributes, indexed in a way that
will allow them to be revoked or amended.
Identity management schemes will need
standardized formats for machine reference. An
assertion blockchain should be used to record and
authenticate
identity
relationships
including
relationships with public keys.
Delegation schemes will need some aspect of
standardization in order to avoid user confusion.
Specifically, we will need standards that help ensure
that delegation consequences are explicit.
Performance aids, usually in the form of web
services, that help expose delegation consequences
and problems with composite device configurations,
will need standard modalities for warnings and
notifications. Standard policies for persistently
providing certain types of warnings (say, related to
safety or cyberattack) will need to be considered.

6. Summary and related work
We have analyzed the problems relating to IoT
trust, safety, privacy, and security, and argued that
traditional computer security approaches will not be
effective. We have identified what we believe to be
the most powerful and useful solutions based on an
old and largely abandoned computer security
approach (reference monitor), together with a system
architecture approach making the reference monitor
concept viable (categorization of resources and
device virtualization), and a universal approach to
trust management based on blockchains. Our goal has
been to find a set of prescriptions for IoT trust that
can be standardized without being overly
constraining, and which can be used for IoT devices
of all types.
We have argued that the key to effective
governance of IoT device resources is to simplify
interaction models to the point that the reference
monitor approach is feasible for large distributed
systems, and while we point out that device selfdefense is the most scalable strategy, we have
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discussed the use of cloud services and device
virtualization (digital twins) that can provide
performance aids for the maintenance of security
associations and key management, relieving devices
of the responsibility for the complex tasks those
systems can involve, while simplifying the
interaction model.
Important related work is being done applying
social graph concepts for trust management of IoT
devices [21], especially for devices that operate more
autonomously, making greater demands on our
ability to reason about trust and automate its
management.
Additional related work is aimed at monitoring
IoT device behaviors [22] in order to strengthen
system security by identifying behavioral anomalies
in device interactions. These technologies can be
used in conjunction with dynamic policy
management that can be administered using some of
the infrastructure we advocate.
To make trust management more effective, we
introduced the possibility of using assertion
blockchains to replace the use of the hierarchical
X.509 certification schemes. Such an approach can
be “open, but with governance.” That is, we can
imagine a blockchain with embedded trust and policy
graphs that anyone can use and rely on for virtually
any kind of assertion relating to IoT devices, users,
manufacturers and attributes, yet has trust anchors
that can be used for root policies in applications. This
blockchain will also feature governance policies that
can ensure the scalability, proper functioning, and
relatively smooth evolution of the blockchain.
We wish to accelerate the debate on how much to
standardize, and how strictly. The drivers of IoT we
mentioned above make it necessary for open, public
oversight of IoT system evolution to emerge.
The concept of a universally accessible trust
management oriented assertion blockchain that is
subject to explicit governance will be controversial
and a challenge to properly implement, but it seems
so potentially comprehensive and adaptable that we
will continue to better define and implement this
approach.

7. References
[1] Angel Lozano, www.dtic.upf.edu/~alozano/innovation/
[2]www.pcworld.com/article/155984/worst_tech_predictio
ns.html
[3] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_standard
[4] S. Sicari, A. Rizzardi, L.A. Grieco, A. Coen-Porisini,
"Security,privacy and trust in Internet of Things: The road
ahead", Computer Networks, Vol. 76, pp. 146-164, Jan.
2015.

[5] Bernabe, J. B., Ramos, J. L. H., & Gómez-Skarmeta, A.
F. (2016). TACIoT: multidimensional trust-aware access
control system for the Internet of Things. Soft Comput.,
20(5), 1763-1779.
[6] X.Xu, N.Bessis, J.Cao “An Autonomic Agent Trust
Model for IoT systems”, Procedia Computer Science 21
(2013) 107 – 113.
[7] F.Bao, I-R Chen, “Dynamic trust management for
internet of things applications”, Proceedings of the 2012
international workshop on Self-aware internet of things
Pages 1-6.
[8] M.O’Neill, “Insecurity by Design: Today’s IoT Device
Security Problem”, Engineering 2 (2016) 48–49.
[9] K. Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day, Crown publishers,
NY, NY, 2014
[10] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IFTTT
[11] T. Jaeger, Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security
(2nd Ed.), Springer, NY, NY, 2011, pp. 1038-1040.
[12] J. Anderson, 'Computer Security Technology Planning
Study', ESD-TR-73-51, US Air Force Electronic Systems
Division(1973).Section4.1.1 http://csrc.nist.gov/publication
s/history/ande72.pdf
[13] M.Grieves, J.Vickers, “Digital Twin: Mitigating
Unpredictable, Undesirable Emergent Behavior in Complex
Systems”, in Transdisciplinary Perspectives on Complex
Systems, F-J Kahlen, S. Flumerfelt, A. Alves, Editors,
Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 2017
[14] W.B. Bradley, W.B., D.P. Maher, “The NEMO P2P
service orchestration framework.” In System Sciences,
2004. Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International
Conference on (pp. 10-pp). IEEE.
[15] K.Christidis, M.Devetsikiotis “Blockchains and Smart
Contracts for the Internet of Things”, IEEE Access,
2016, Vol. 4, Pages: 2292 - 2303
[16] H.M. Kim, M. Laskowski,, Towards an OntologyDriven Blockchain Design for Supply Chain Provenance
(August
23,
2016).
Available
at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2828369 or http://dx.doi.o
rg/10.2139/ssrn.2828369
[17] Y. Zhang, J. Wen, “The IoT electric business model:
Using blockchain technology for the internet of things”,
Peer-to-Peer
Networking
and
Applications
July
2017, Volume 10, Issue 4, pp 983–994.
[18] G. Bracha, Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement
Protocols, Information and Computation vol. 75,2, Nov.
1987; Elsevier, Amsterdam, NL. Pp. 130-143
[19] D. Maher, https://www.oreilly.com/learning/a-humancentric-trust-model-for-the-internet-of-things
[20] ITU-T Focus group on Driver Distraction, Report on
User Interface Requirements for Automotive Applications,
www.itu.int/en/ITUT/focusgroups/distraction/Documents/d
eliverables/ , 2013.
[21]
M.Nitti, R.Girau,
L.Atzori,
“Trustworthiness
Management in the Social Internet of Things”, IEEE
Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Year: 2014, Volume: 26, Issue: 5 Pages: 1253 – 1266
[22] T.R.Fuller, G.E.Deane, “IoT applications in an
adaptive intelligent system with responsive anomaly
detection”,
IEEE
2016
Future
Technologies
Conference(FTC), Page(s):754 - 762

Page 5675

